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––––––––––––
Contemporary (analytic) aesthetics has for the most part neglected ugliness. Of the 
available literature on ugliness, moreover, few pieces aim at clarifying the concept of 
ugliness, a considerable share of research concentrating on exegeses of Kants views 
about it instead.  Perhaps this is because ugliness is a peripheral concept in aesthetics, 1
or of comparable insigni®cance. Hardlyremarks about (and criticisms of) contemporary 
art to the effect that it has embraced ugliness,  debates concerning whether ugliness can 2
 For example, see: Garrett Thomson, Kants Problems with Ugliness, The Journal of Aesthetics 1
and Art Criticism 50 (1992), 107-115; David Shier, Why Kant Finds Nothing Ugly, British Journal of 
Aesthetics 38 (1998) 412-418; Christian Wenzel, Kant Finds Nothing Ugly?, British Journal of 
Aesthetics 39 (1999) 416-422; Paul Guyer, Kant and the Purity of the Ugly, Kant e-Prints 3 (2004) 
1-21; Sean McConnell, How Kant Might Explain Ugliness, British Journal of Aesthetics 48 (2008) 
205-228; James Phillips, Placing Ugliness in Kants Third Critique: A Reply to Paul Guyer, Kant-
Studien 102 (2011) 385-395; Alix Cohen, Kant on the Possibility of Ugliness, British Journal of 
Aesthetics 53 (2013) 199-209.
 See, for example, Roger Scruton, Beauty (Oxford: OUP, 2009) 167-194; Arthur C. Danto, The 2
Abuse of Beauty (Chicago: Open Court, 2003).
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sometimes be a positive aesthetic value  or even transformed into a kind of beauty,  3 4
whether nature can or ever is ugly,  whether ugliness is connected to other kinds of value 5
such as moral value,  suggest otherwise. Neglect of ugliness is striking given that even 6
Sibley, upon denying that aesthetic concepts are condition-governed, spoke of ugliness 
as possibly an exception to this rule.  For if ugliness is analyzable at least partly in terms 7
of objective conditions, it may shed considerable light on much that is of gerenal interest to 
aesthetics, particularly if, as is plausible, it is understood as the contrary of beauty, such 
that similar logical considerations apply to both concepts.
Here, I concentrate my discussion on what I call the deformity-related  conception 8
of ugliness. Ultimately, I argue that deformity, understood in a certain way, and 
displeasure, jointly suf®ce for ugliness. In the ®rst section, I motivate and defend my 
proposal. I begin by locating the deformity-related conception in aesthetic tradition, 
offering examples in support, and rejecting related alternative suggestions. I proceed to 
 See, for example, Matthew Kieran, Aesthetic Value: Beauty, Ugliness, and Incoherence, 3
Philosophy 72 (1997) 383-399.
 See, for example, Samuel Alexander, Beauty and Other Forms of Value, 163-165 and Bernard 4
Bosanquet, The Æsthetic Theory of Ugliness, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1 
(1889-1890) 32-48. Both speak of ugliness as a kind of dif®cult beauty or an ingredient in beauty.
 Something denied by advocates of a positive aesthetics. For this view, see, for example, Allen 5
Carlson, Nature and Positive Aesthetics, Environmental Ethics 6 (1984) 5-34; for a critical 
approach, see Emily Brady, The Ugly Truth: Negative Aesthetics and Environment, Royal Institute 
of Philosophy Supplement 69 (2011) 83-99.
 See, for example, Berys Gaut, Art, Emotion and Ethics (Oxford: OUP, 2007), esp. 114-132.6
 Frank Sibley, Aesthetic Concepts, The Philosophical Review 68 (1959) 421-450, at 433n.7
 The phrase is from Frank Sibley, Some Notes On Ugliness, in Frank Sibley, Approach to 8
Aesthetics, ed. John Benson, Betty Redfern, and Jeremy Roxbee Cox (Oxford: OUP, 2001), 
191-207, although Sibley uses it to refer to the claim that deformity is necessary for ugliness.
2
suggest that my proposal captures much of what we ordinarily think of as ugly. In the 
second section, I argue that the account boasts considerable theoretical merits, in 
comprising an objective criterion for ugliness, offering unity and comprehensiveness, and 
being informative and explanatorily potent. In the third section I discuss four objections, by 
way of demonstrating that the proposal withstands re¯ective scrutiny.
I.
Some usages of ugliness clearly have no bearing on aesthetics. In talk of ugly accidents, 
wounds, or truths, ugliness is shorthand for severe, fatal, deep, and inconvenient or 
undesirable, respectively. But most uses of ugly are aesthetic and quite uncontroversial. 
In its aesthetic usage, moreover, ugliness, like beauty, admits of two further senses, 
namely a broad and a somewhat narrower sense. In its broad sense ugliness comprises 
all negative aesthetic qualities, including the likes of the boring, garish, trite, kitsch, silly.  9
However, in its narrower sense, it refers to a certain aesthetic property and its subspecies. 
It is this last sense that interests me here.
Although contemporary aestheticians rarely discuss ugliness, we ®nd a long 
tradition that conceives of it as deformity. This is re¯ected in the fact that deformity was 
once the standard term in English to refer to ugliness, and permeated the writings of 
aestheticians in the eighteenth-century. To illustrate, ugly appears only once in the three 
volumes of Shaftesburys Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, and once in 
Hutchesons Inquiry, where it is used as a synonym of the frequently used deformd. 
Similarly, in his Treatise and Enquiries, Hume routinely contrasts beauty to deformity, 
rarely speaking of ugliness. While rather quaint, such usage is not altogether alien to 
 See, for example, Ruth Lorand, Beauty and its Opposites, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art 9
Criticism 52 (1994), 399-406.
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modern speakers.  After all, current linguistic practice also supports a strong link between 10
ugliness and deformity. At least in English, the rich vocabulary of terms which can be used 
to describe ugly objects includes many pertaining to deformity, such as the polluted, 
diseased, spoiled, derelict, dis®gured, malformed, contorted, distorted, crooked, 
misshaped, marred, mutilated, spoiled, blemished, incoherent, disuni®ed, disharmonious.  11
It is tempting to take such usage at face value and proceed to de®ne ugliness as 
deformity: 
Ugliness-as-Deformity (UD) = for any object, O, O is ugly if, and only if, O is deformed
One problem with UD is that the notion of deformity is vague. I beg the readers 
indulgence, however, while I set this issue aside for nowI shall return to it shortlyfor 
there are far more serious dif®culties for UD. Certain sounds, like ®ngernails scraping a 
blackboard or forks scratching steel utensils, and things like slime, faeces, vomit, and so 
on, are plausibly ugly, yet cannot literally be described as deformed. In fact, if as is 
plausible deformity depends on some standard or norm, then things such as the 
aforementioned do not even seem to be candidates for deformity, for there are hardly any 
standards or norms pertinent to slime or blackboard-scraping sounds. So it looks like UD is 
too strong.
 Ugliness connection to deformity is not limited to Anglophone thought. See, for example, 10
Diderots entry on ugliness in his Encyclopédie, in Andrei Pop and Mechtild Widrich (eds), 
Ugliness: The Non-Beautiful in Art and Theory (London: I.B. Tauris, 2014) 216-217.
 These adjectives can be found in: Lucius Garvin, The Problem of Ugliness in Art, The 11
Philosophical Review 57 (1948) 404-409; G.P. Henderson, The Concept of Ugliness, British 
Journal of Aesthetics 6 (1966) 219-229; Sibley, Some Notes on Ugliness.
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Upon rejecting UD, perhaps we could follow Sibley and propose that deformity is 
only a necessary condition for ugliness.  But if the sorts of objects just surveyed are not 12
even plausible candidates for deformity, then the foregoing considerations equally bear 
against this view. Sibley does discuss such counterexamples, suggesting that when we 
®nd things that cannot be deformed ugly, we are actually seeing them in terms of other 
things that can be deformed.  But establishing that deformity is necessary for ugliness 13
requires ruling out cases where we judge something ugly without even knowing what it 
is;  but this labour appears Herculean.14
Yet we should not yet give up on the intuition linking ugliness and deformity. After 
all, many of the things that we ®nd ugly are deformed or encompass manifest deformities. 
At least prima facie, rheumy eyes, missing limbs, dereliction, and the like, render people, 
animals, and buildings ugly. To preserve the core intuition in UD, I propose to examine an 
alternative suggestion. Claiming that deformity suf®ces for ugliness preserves the link 
between ugliness and deformity, whilst eluding counterexamples such as those 
threatening UD and undermining a necessity claim:
Deformity-Related Ugliness (DRU) = for any object, O, if O is deformed, then O is ugly
I now returnas promisedto the question of what is meant by deformity, for much of 
the plausibility of this proposal depends on how we understand this rather protean notion. 
Sibley himself takes two shots at capturing deformity. Initially he suggests that the notion 
 Sibley, Some Notes on Ugliness.12
 ibid.13
 Andrea Sauchelli, Sibley on Beautiful and Ugly, Philosophical Papers 43 (2014) 377-404, at 14
396ff.
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of deformity, as it relates to ugliness, is best captured by the umbrella term denatured 
and comprises
such abnormalities and distortions as are covered by a whole range of notions  
like distorted, defective, de®led, soiled, mutilated, discoloured, blotchy, withered, 
scarred, dis®gured, emaciated, swollen, bloated, begrimed, stunted, dwarfed, 
wizened, decaying, mouldering, blighted, festering, and a host of others indicative of 
abnormality or defect in shape, colour, size, health, growth, etc.15
Later on, Sibley opts for denormalized as the catch-all term instead, whereby is indicated,
some departure by way of exaggeration, extravagance, or discolouring, being too 
this or too that, swollen, bulging, twisted, red eyes, knock knees, from a norm or 
notion of xs by something out of place, inappropriate in an x.  16
To clarify things, it would help to distinguish between different senses of deformity that 
seem to be run together in Sibleys lists. Deformity, as captured by the adjectives above, 
can be understood either as (a) abnormality or pronounced difference (swollen, 
emaciated, dwarfed, bulging, etc.); (b) malfunction (one sense of defective), or (c) defect 
in form (distorted, dis®gured, etc.). While these notions are interrelated, no entailment 
relations hold between them. A defective engine can function properly (circumstances may 
never arise where the defect is manifested) and it can be statistically normal for these 
engines to be defective (their manufacture is generally poor). A crucial distinction between 
these notions is between different standards or norms from which the deformed is a 
 Sibley, Some Notes on Ugliness, 197.15
 ibid., 203.16
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departure, which can be either statistical or teleological (understood here as a catch-all 
term for there being a function or end properly attributable to an object, relative to which an 
object can be defective; many uses of (a) and (c) seem paradigmatic of these departures, 
respectively).
Now, I think that, if DRU is to be plausible, deformity will have to be understood in 
the sense pertinent to the notion of defect, partly because the alternatives fail. The 
statistical conception looks inadequate once we observe how apparently slight departures 
from the relevant norms can make a world of difference, turning what seemed beautiful 
ugly, as can a rheumy eye, or a missing tooth or two, neither of which look particularly 
statistically signi®cant departures. Conversely, great departures from the norm need not 
result in ugliness. Exceptional tallness or muscularity do not compromise ones beauty 
(and could even enhance it), statistically signi®cant though they may be. Dwar®sm is 
statistically highly off, but not all dwarves are ugly. Deformity understood as malfunction 
will not do for DRU either; simply because one has just died, say, it does not seem 
plausible that he is ugly; a malfunctioning heart is not necessarily thereby an ugly organ, 
nor is a clock that malfunctions just because someone threw water on it, an ugly clock. So, 
it looks like we are left with deformity as defect in form. Although this too can be 
understood in different ways, here is how I propose to understand it:
Deformity = if an objects, Os, form frustrates, inhibits, or hinders O from realising its 
end(s), then O is deformed
It is adequate for our purposes to think of form as the ensemble and interrelations 
between an objects parts, although I think that other accounts of form will also do.  More 17
 For a discussion of different accounts of form see Noël Carroll, The Philosophy of Art (London: 17
Routledge, 1999), 137-152.
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important is the notion of end(s), which I conceive rather narrowly here, as referring to an 
objects proper end(s), i.e., those which can be understood as properly attributable to, or 
belonging to, the object,  often by virtue of the kind of object it is, as opposed to being 18
incidental or arbitrarily attributed to it. Often these will often be functions, although ends 
are not limited to strictly-speaking functional items. For instance, proper ends can be 
identi®ed with (or depend on) intentions or purposes of objects designers or makers.  So 19
what I have in mind here is ends such that a given object can embody them, as it were, 
as opposed to any ends that an object can realise. The intuitive contrast is re¯ected in the 
linguistic distinction between an objects having function F and its functioning as F.  For 20
example, suppose a bookcase has the function of storing books, but can also function as a 
display cabinet, or decorative object. Deformity says that it will be deformed insofar as the 
arrangement of its parts, etc., hinder it from storing books, rather than when it falls short of 
functioning in other ways.21
Deformity helps to explain why different senses of deformity are often run together. 
A suf®ciently extreme departure from statistical norms will, more often than not (provided 
the object has certain functions or ends), lead to an objects satisfying Deformity (though 
not necessarily because of this departure). For instance, there are many shapes that an 
aeroplane or ship cannot have (under the laws of physics in the actual world) and 
 While identifying an objects proper end(s) is dif®cult, I assume it is generally possible. For 18
simplicity, I ignore here complexities arising from some objects having several proper functions.
 Here I cannot discuss how these can be identi®ed, but an excellent account is Michael 19
Baxandall, Patterns of Intention (Yale: Yale University Press, 1987).
 Glenn Parsons and Allen Carlson, Functional Beauty (Oxford: OUP, 2008), 65-69.20
 The present conception of deformity and corresponding species of ugliness is limited in its 21
applicability to objects which can be understood to have functions or ends. Nonetheless, since 
most (if not all) living organisms and artefacts plausibly fall under this category, this is enough for 
the account to be interesting and informative.
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departure of shape in those directions will eventually make the object satisfy the condition 
above. Similarly, an object that satis®es the condition above is more likely to malfunction 
than one that does not satisfy it. But not every functional object that is malfunctioning is 
one which satis®es Deformity; external forces can also interfere with an objects 
functionality.
Deformitys suitability for DRU can be seen from the fact that it is compatible with 
the aforementioned near-platitudinous observation that neither small nor great divergences 
from a (statistical) norm, even if they are in some sense deformities, seem ugly-making in 
a principled way. Slight non-aesthetic differences can make great aesthetic differences, 
and great non-aesthetic differences can sometimes have little or no aesthetic effectfor 
worse no less than better. Moreover, features such as scars, pockmarks, warts, for 
instance, are not necessarily ugly, nor make a person ugly. But Deformity, together with 
DRU, predicts, quite plausibly, that if these are multiple, prominent, or in areas important 
enough to detract from performances of ordinary functions, there is little room for doubt as 
to whether or not they will be ugly-making.
An example should make Deformitys connection to ugliness, as per DRU, more 
intuitively plausible. Obesity is hardly an attractive feature. But it is distinguished from what 
is called morbid obesity. Now, whereas whether an obese human being will be physically 
ugly or not is quite unpredictable, it is quite plausible that morbid obesity is at least prima 
facie an ugly-making property. Such ugliness is explored and vividly presented in works 
such as John Isaacs fat man sculpture series, where exaggerated obese ®gures are 
presented and often placed in unsettling poses and states. Morbidly obese, though not 
always merely obese, people, are normally ugly. The relevant difference is captured by 
Deformity: morbid obesity consists in body mass inhibitive of an individuals capacities to 
perform basic human (bodily) functions, including walking, breathing, etc. Hence, with 
9
Deformity, DRU neatly explains why morbidly obese humans will be ugly, whereas this is 
not always true of merely obese people.
No doubt, it will be objected that the foregoing remarks evince cultural bias. For 
there are, and certainly have been, societies which ®nd obesity unfailingly attractive, 
evidence for which are the well-known Palaeolithic Venus ®gurines.
Should we simply deny that the people who did not ®nd such Venuses ugly are 
competent judges? Maybe, although that would be ad hoc. A little evolutionary hindsight, 
however, readily suggests a better answer. In the Palaeolithic case, such Venuses were 
probably experienced as models of well-formedness. Why? Because in times when food 
was scarce and a luxury, being obese was clearly a sign not only of a luxurious lifestyle, 
but possibly also of longevity, fertility, and so on. I imagine that similar beliefs are 
entertained in other societies were obesity is found attractive. By contrast, most of us 
reading a paper like this one probably live in relatively af¯uent societies, where obesity 
signals a host of undesirable qualities; but we are also vividly aware that obesity is 
severely compromising, causing health problems, and so on. It is therefore unsurprising 
that we view such a condition as a deformity.22
The lesson to draw from the previous paragraph is that what people deem to be 
ugly is not just what is deformed. Rather, for something to be judged ugly in virtue of being 
deformed, it must also be experienced as deformed. To accommodate this observation, we 
should amend DRU as follows:
DRU* = For any object, O, if O is
(i) deformed and
(ii) is experienced (in perception or contemplation) as (i) 
 The discussion above is informed by that in Stephen Davies, The Artful Species (Oxford: OUP, 22
2012), 105-108. 
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then O is ugly.
The importance of (ii) will become even clearer with another example. Chinese foot 
binding was presumably perceived to result in more elegant or attractive feet, not simply 
elegant things. We may ®nd the results of that practice very ugly indeed, but those who 
partook in it (at least on the observers side) presumably did not. The practice evidently 
culminated in abnormally shaped, hardly usable, feet. While walking was possible, it had to 
be performed in a highly circumscribed fashion. Yet, it would be odd to suggest that those 
who found bound feet attractive experienced them as deformed. It is far more likely that, 
although the feet were in fact deformed in the sense of Deformity, they were not perceived 
as deformed. Indeed, this aptly explains the change in appreciative attitudes towards 
bound feet: once they came to be correctly experienced as deformed, they were no longer 
found elegant or whatever, but ugly instead.
But now consider Meret Oppenheims Object, which is a tea set covered in fur. This 
is clearly a deformed object, and is plausibly meant to be experienced as deformed. Yet 
Object is by no means obviously ugly. In fact, one might think that it is rather elegant and 
pretty. 
Similarly, grossly deforming an everyday object like a coat-hanger or a safety pin 
will not necessarily result in an ugly object. It may well result in something more beautiful.
Nor is it uncommon to ®nd certain withered, dying, or diseased trees rather 
picturesque, or even beautiful. Insofar as these objects count as deformed even by our 
high-pitched criteria, DRU* seems to face numerous counterexamples. So DRU* cannot 
be the whole story either.
It is tempting to respond that in such cases what happens is that the tea cup and 
spoon, coat-hangers, safety pins, trees, and so on, in being deformed, will in fact become 
uglier qua coat-hangers, safety pins, trees, etc., even if they thereby become prettier 
11
objects generally. But this is far from clear, since the point of these examples is that we 
may not in the slightest be moved to call such objects ugly. It would be odd to insist that 
seeing these things as deformed objects of their kind will actually prompt us to call them 
ugly, for it would be perfectly intelligible to insist that we still do not judge them to be ugly.
This should not be surprising. These counterexamples simply make palpable the 
fact that we will be hard-put to capture ugliness without reference to subjects responses. 
This seems true not only of Meret Oppenheims work and the other examples of objects 
which can please us, deformed though they may be; but also of the examples of obesity 
and foot binding considered earlier. It is not simply that morbidly obese people and bound 
feet are not perceived as deformed in certain cultures where they are not found ugly; they 
do not displease perceivers either.
Intuitively, of course, ugliness is bound up with displeasure, so that, if not a 
platitude, this should be an eminently plausible suggestion. We hardly call anything ugly 
unless we are to some degree, however slight, displeased by the object.  Like the 23
connection between ugliness and deformity, the connection between ugliness and 
displeasure is crystallized in language. Synonyms for ugliness include the repellent, 
horrible, disgusting, disagreeable, grotesque, abominable, repulsive, odious, foul, 
obscene, repugnant, frightening, abject, horrifying, frightful, nightmarish, revolting, 
sickening.  We should therefore modify our proposal to capture this observation. In place 24
of the suggestion that experiencing an objects deformity suf®ces for ugliness, I propose 
the following:
 See Ronald Moore, Ugliness, in Encyclopedia of Aesthetics. Ed. Michael Kelly. (Oxford Art 23
Online: OUP) <http://www.oxfordartonline.com/subscriber/article/opr/t234/e0511> accessed 12 
December 2015; Henderson, The Concept of Ugliness, at 219-220.
 These adjectives are found in Umberto Eco, On Ugliness, trans. Alastair McEwen (New York: 24
Rizzoli, 2011), 16.
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DRU** = For any object, O, if O is
(i) deformed and
(ii) displeases (good judges, under normal circumstances) because it is 
experienced (in perception or contemplation) as (i)
then O is ugly.25
DRU** essentially states that whatever is deformed, and thereby displeases suitable 
subjects in perception or contemplation, is ugly. DRU** can capture and explain cases that 
point to a connection between ugliness and deformity; but it also eschews 
counterexamples such as those discussed above. For it can be countered by pointing
neither to deformed objects that are not ugly, such as the coat-hanger we encountered 
earlier, nor objects that are ugly but not deformed, such as slime, vomit, and so on.
DRU** captures much of what we ordinarily deem ugly. For instance, a Google-
image search of ugly produces torrents of photographs and representations of highly 
dis®gured humansso much so that little question remains as to whether they conform to 
my conception of deformity. Lips too far apart to withhold liquids, limbs misshapen in ways 
that would prevent anyone from moving around, eyes and mouths too small or too large to 
perform ordinary functions like emotional expression, grossly dis®gured faces and bodies, 
 The parenthetical conditions cannot be defended here, though I take it that they are reasonable. 25
Since ugliness is a response-dependent property, certain requirements must be met if subjects 
responses are to be criterial of whether an object that is found ugly, is ugly. The second 
parenthesis emphasises the directness of the experience (though without limiting it to perceptible 
objects). Finally, the connection captured by because is intended to suggest that the affective 
response is non-inferential, indicating that displeasure is grounded in or directed at the experience 
of something as deformed.
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and so on. Such things, moreover, hardly fail to arouse our displeasure, in the form of 
horror, repulsion, revoltwe ordinarily recoil from such images.
Furthermore, in Ecos anthology On Ugliness the themes of death, putrefaction, 
tortured, mutilated bodies, skeletons, cadavers, etc., predominate. Such is the subject 
matter of works like Peter Brueghel the Elders Triumph of Death (1652), The Deceased 
Lovers Death and Lust by an upper-Rhine master (16th C.), and many others. Similarly, 
images of disease are particularly striking examples of ugliness, especially where its 
manifestations involve incapacitating physical dis®gurations, such as elephantiasis, 
abnormal hair-growth, neuro®bromatosis, etc. Again, these objects seem to conform to 
Deformity and to displease us in experience (even if they are sometimes rendered 
beautifully). 
Likewise, Jake and Dinos Chapmans oeuvrewhich for the most part consists of 
hyper-realistic sculptures and paintings representing deformed human beings, children 
included, with features such as snouts, genitalia, anuses, in place of noses, mouths, ears; 
rotting, mutilated, or contorted faces and bodies, and so onlends additional support to 
the connection between ugliness and deformity. For the Chapman brothers works 
undoubtedly depict some truly ugly stuff; in each case, moreover, what is depicted is 
human deformity, pure and simple; nor is there room for doubt that, at least in terms of 
their appearances, the subjects in these works are displeasing under any ordinary sense 
of the term.
Finally, to avoid the charge that I rely too heavily on my own intuitions, here are two 
philosophers on two artworks which represent objects that presumably meet DRU** and 
seem ugly. First, commenting on Patricia Piccininis The Young Family (2002), which 
portrays an uncannily anthropomorphic old female dog breastfeeding her puppies, Jennifer 
MacMahon attributes its ugliness to its deformity, suggesting that the old dog's face, if it 
had been seen attached to a dog's body and in its normal context, might have evoked 
14
tenderness or at worst indifference. However, in this context, as a mutant human being, it 
evokes quite a different response of painful curiosity and anxiety.26
Second, Matthew Kieran, re¯ecting on Bacons Three Studies for Figures at the 
Base of a Cruci®xion (1944) elaborates as follows:
The viewer is presented with three separate canvases, reminiscent of a triptych, 
each depicting a strangely anthropomorphic animal-like form. The ®gure on the left 
is crouching on a table, huddling itself in a bird-like manner, its vaguely human face 
a quarter on and turned away. The central ®gure is side on, the elongated neck 
stretching from the bulbous, ostrich-like body, bringing its face in full confrontation 
with the viewer. The threatening, repulsive, mouth of lips and teeth is somewhat 
agape, and where there should be eyes the face is bandaged. The mouth emerges 
directly from the neck rather than belonging to a distinct face. The third canvas 
represents a sharpened, cow-like body, its elongated neck bringing a viciously 
howling mouth into three quarter view. The neck opens up into rows of teeth, an 
ear placed behind the lower jaw juts out, the mouth stretches open in a scream, 
extended in a manner impossible for any human skull. These  ®gures are 
visceral in their impact, jolting one into sensations of fright, horror, isolation, and 
angst. Their force derives from the fusion of bestial forms with anthropomorphising 
faces.  the heads, though recognisably akin to human faces, are distinctly 
anything than human.  here are creatures, ugly, deformed 27
 All from Jennifer MacMahon, Aesthetics and Material Beauty: Aesthetics Naturalized (New York: 26
Routledge, 2007), 168 (emphasis mine).
 Matthew Kieran, Revealing Art (London: Routledge, 2005), 184-185 (emphasis mine).27
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The deformity-related conception, then, captures several reasonably uncontroversial and 
clear cases of ugliness that are both intuitive and meet with philosophical consensus. 
Hence, I think that DRU** is an attractive, plausible proposal.
II.
Aside from capturing numerous instances of ugliness, thereby being quite comprehensive, 
DRU** offers a partly objective conception of ugliness since it claims that deformity is 
partly suf®cient for ugliness, and deformity is a truth-apt criterion. DRU**, moreover, does 
so without sacri®cing the plausible view whereby ugliness is response-dependent, since it 
also requires that an object displease competent judges, such that an objects ugliness or 
lack thereof cannot be decided on objective grounds alone.
Thanks to the conception of deformity built into DRU**, the account captures and 
explains one sense in which a whole host of entities and artefacts can be ugly, albeit they 
hardy share any observable features. Since anything that has form and so can be 
deformed, assuming it can also displease, can be ugly, DRU** captures a single sense in 
which objects ranging from abstract sensory artefacts like musical compositions and their 
performances, to sculptures, animals, organic nature, and mathematical theorems, can be 
ugly.
Ugly mathematics, in fact, also throws into relief the informativeness and 
explanatory force of DRU**. Talk of mathematical ugliness looks like a particularly dif®cult 
case to capture, not only because it is rarely discussed, but also because it is unclear what 
it consists in, over and above an expression of displeasure or dislike. Yet DRU** aptly 
captures ugliness in mathematics such that it neither forms an obscure class of its own, 
nor consists in mere dislike, in which case its genuineness or literalness could be 
questioned.
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Consider Appel and Hakens proof of the four-colour theorem, frequently cited as 
paradigmatic of ugly mathematics. The theorem claims that the minimum number of 
colours required to adequately distinguish between regions on every map on a plane or 
sphere is four. The proof involves a computer programmed to run through all possible 
combinations (around two thousand) thereby establishing the theorem. On the assumption 
that mathematicians calling this proof ugly implies their displeasure in it, my claim is that 
common explanations on offer for their aversion to the proof are reducible to the sense of 
deformity in DRU**. These are as follows:
(a) the proof cannot be veri®ed a priori because it involves steps that are justi®ed 
empirically; this is at odds with the nature of mathematical proofs28
(b) the proof cannot be (humanly) veri®ed because it would involve impracticably many 
steps; this is at odds with the nature of mathematical proofs29
(c) the proof makes use of a computer, which could be faulty, so that its truth cannot be 
guaranteed; this is at odds with the nature of mathematical proofs30
 See Michael de Villiers, The Role and Function of Quasi-empirical Methods in Mathematics, 28
Canadian Journal of Math, Science & Technology Education 4 (2004) 397-418.
 See Peter Swinnerton-Dyer, The Justi®cation of Mathematical Statements, Philosophical 29
Transactions of the Royal Society: Mathematical, Physical, and Engineering Sciences 363 (2005) 
2437-2447.
 See ibid.; see also Thomas Tymoczko, The Four-Color Problem and Its Philosophical 30
Signi®cance, The Journal of Philosophy 76 (1979) 57-83.
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Both explanations  involve a claim to the effect that the proofs form, namely the 31
computers running through the relevant cases, inhibits or fails to realize one or another of 
the ends of mathematical proofs. Whether by not proceeding a priori, or not being 
practicably veri®able, it either violates an end of mathematical proofs, or, what I take to be 
equivalent, a norm which is constitutive of mathematical proofs as construed by 
practitioners and so taken as an end in practice (non-violation of such norms or rules is an 
end relative to mathematical practice, inasmuch as they are criterial of a proofs success in 
the ®rst place). In other words, all three of the most commonly cited explanations for why 
mathematicians are displeased by Appel and Hakens proof seem to be explained by their 
experience of it as deformed. Hence, DRU** captures (at least some) mathematical 
ugliness.
Another domain where the explanatory force of DRU** shows forth concerns the 
intuitive connection between ugliness and evil. Whether we re¯ect on our ordinary 
experience of ugliness, or look for frequently cited, widely accepted, or paradigmatic 
examples of ugliness, we shall ®nd many of them featuring not so much observable 
deformities, but images, literary descriptions, and other kinds of representations or 
expressions of evil; in other words, manifestations of moral vice.32
I take the fact that we often ®nd and classify such qualities and subject matter as 
ugly to indicate that the phenomenology involved in experiences thereof is recognisable as 
saliently like that involved in our experience of other ugly objects. But one may resist the 
 Ulianov Montaño, Explaining Beauty in Mathematics (Cham: Springer, 2014), 37, rejects these 31
explanations. While I cannot examine his arguments here, suf®ce it to say that (a) through (c) 
remain orthodoxy amongst mathematicians.
 See Karl Rosenkranz, The Aesthetics of Ugliness, trans. Andrei Pop and Mechtild Widrich 32
(London: Bloomsbury, 2015) 31. See also Sibley, Some Notes on Ugliness, 205; Jerome Stolnitz, 
On Ugliness in Art, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 11 (195), at 2.
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connection between evil and ugliness, as a con¯ation between different spheres of 
judgement.  Yet DRU** may be able to explain the connection. Although I cannot argue 33
for this here,  if the moral vices were understood as deformities of human character, viz., 34
traits whose complex makeup inhibits, hinders, or otherwise compromises ends proper to 
human beings (which, conversely, are served by the virtues), then on DRU** these traits 
would turn out to be ugly. Thus, at least under a popular conception of moral vice,  DRU** 35
explains a persistent intuition concerning ugliness.
Jointly, the foregoing considerations show that in addition to its intuitive 
attractiveness, DRU** holds considerable theoretical promise. It provides an objective 
basis for some ugliness, and offers unity and comprehensiveness in capturing a sense 
whereby diverse objects can be ugly. Also, DRU** is both informative and explanatorily 
forceful by allowing us to capture and explain at least some seemingly puzzling cases of 
ugliness.
III.
No doubt DRU** will be met with counterexamples. I consider some of these below and 
show that they can be addressed without resort to ad hoc moves or implausible 
commitments.
First, suppose one has a deformed heart. His heart is malformed in a way that 
inhibits performance of its function. This deformity is moreover experienced as painful. It 
would, nonetheless, be odd to say that the heart is ugly. Perhaps it is even found prettier 
 See, for example, Mary Devereaux, The Ugly (American Society of Aesthetics, 2005) <http://33
aesthetics-online.org/?page=DevereauxUgly> accessed 10 December 2015.
 I explore this argument in greater detail [deleted for anonymity].34
 Known as neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism, this is the of®cial meta-ethical view in virtue 35
ethics, espoused by, inter alia, Philippa Foot, Natural Goodness (Oxford: OUP, 2001) and Rosalind 
Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: OUP, 1999). 
19
than normal hearts (perhaps it looks more like the stereotypical lay drawing of a heart 
rather than a lump of muscles).
But pain is different from displeasure. Whereas displeasure is characterized in part 
by reference to an intentional object, pain, while localizable, characteristically lacks 
intentionality, in not being about, or directed at anything in particular.  Thus, as pleasure 36
in beauty is normally understood to be distinct from pleasant sensation, so displeasure in 
DRU** should be understood as distinct from pain. Hence, non-ugly objects eliciting painful 
sensations due to deformities are no counterexamples to my account.
Second, suppose you are reading a text, and stumble across a sentence, or indeed 
a whole paragraph, that is incoherent, such that it fails adequately to convey what is 
presumably intended. This can be very annoying. But it is not clear that one would call this 
ugly.
At least one philosopher, however, has suggested that there is a sort of ugliness in 
the mere fact of incoherence, and this we must call an aesthetic ugliness.  If this is true, 37
then this is hardly a counterexample, for it is not obvious that we should refrain from calling 
such an object ugly. In fact in some cases we may even welcome the suggestion that the 
passage is ugly, as when we locate such a passage in a work by some supposedly 
eminent thinker. So perhaps we should grant that incoherent sentences or passages are 
ugly, at least sometimes. 
But suppose one insists on not calling an incoherent and displeasing passages 
ugly. What is likely going on here is that that the objector is expressing an overall 
 See, for example, Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Cambridge MA: Harvard University 36
Press, 1980), especially 151ff.
 Henderson, The Concept of Ugliness.37
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judgement of the passages aesthetic value.  It may be that the passage, in spite of its 38
incoherence, is overall particularly pleasing in virtue of its sonic properties. But if so, then it 
seems plausible that, if pressed, the objector will not also deny that the passage is ugly in 
some respects, that is, its cognitive or structural features, albeit perhaps beautiful-
sounding. Thus, in this case we should say that the passage is ugly insofar as it is 
deformed, but not ugly insofar as it sounds good, and perhaps not overall or all things 
considered ugly.  Thus, understood in pro tanto fashion, such that something can be ugly 39
insofar as it meets DRU** but also pretty, attractive, or whatever, insofar as it has other, 
positive aesthetic qualities, DRU** is compatible with the claim that deformed objects can 
displease us yet still not be called ugly.
Third, suppose someone has suffered highly dis®guring burns or is missing limbs 
such that perceiving him we cannot help but feel a keen sense of displeasure. Could we 
nonetheless not maintain that such a person is not ugly? A positive answer is suggested 
by Nehamas re¯ections on John Merrick,  a grossly deformed man suffering from 40
 Another possibility may be that the objector favours a view whereby aesthetic properties, 38
including ugliness, necessarily depend on perceptible properties, hence incoherence in writing fails 
to qualify. I have purposely formulated DRU** to allow for ugliness in imperceptible objects. I could, 
of course, modify it to re¯ect the requirement of perceptibility. However, I think that such a view is 
mistaken and must be rejected, because it has highly counterintuitive implications, such as a denial 
of the possibility of mathematical beauty and ugliness, of non-sonic literary beauty, and so on. 
However, if the reader is otherwise inclined, I beg her to oblige me by qualifying DRU**, rather than 
rejecting it outright.
 Note that this can be understood in either of two ways. It might be that the object is overall more 39
beautiful than ugly either in the narrow sense, or in the broad sense, in that it generally has more 
aesthetic merit than demerit. The difference does not matter for the discussion here.
 See Alexander Nehamas, Only a Promise of Happiness (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 40
2007), 59-60.
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neuro®bromatosis, as he is portrayed in David Lynchs ®lm The Elephant Man. For 
Nehamas thinks that although at ®rst we ®nd Merrick ugly, we then experience him as 
beautiful, even though we may be shocked by his appearance.
One likely explanation and answer here can be adduced from has already been 
said. Perhaps in such cases we are either simply making an all-things-considered 
judgement, or foregrounding ones pro tanto aesthetically positive qualities, in either of two 
ways. On the one hand, we might be attending to someones overall appearance, which 
may be very pleasing indeed, save for their deformities, and feeling overall that they are 
beautiful. But this does not rule out DRU** since to do so, it is required that there is no 
respect in which we would call such people ugly. And it is plausible that we should grant 
that insofar as their physical deformity goes, they is ugly, even though he may be beautiful 
overall. But this is not so promising in the case of John Merrick, for he is clearly not overall 
beautiful. On the other hand, though, sometimes we may experience people in light of 
knowledge of their character, or in virtue of expressive features that manifest certain 
pleasing character traits and these are, in the same way as before, outweighing the 
deformities, so to speak.  Once again, however, while we may grant that a person may be 41
beautiful overall, we should allow that insofar as she is deformed, she is ugly. So there is 
no counterexample to DRU** here.
But what if the objector presses on, refusing to call the unfortunate fellow ugly? Two 
explanations will serve as responses here. Perhaps the refusal to call such a deformed 
person ugly may be explained by our displeasure not being taken in the experience of his 
deformity, but rather in the fact that they are deformed. In other words, we may not 
 See ibid. See also Marcia Muelder Eaton, Beauty and Ugliness In and Out of Context, in 41
Matthew Kieran (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics (London: Blackwell, 2005) 39-50 at 49; 
Brady, The Ugly Truth: Negative Aesthetics and the Environment, at 90.
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experience displeasure in perceiving or contemplating the burns or dis®gurations but be 
saddened or whatever at the fellows misfortune. So no counterexample here. 
A better explanation, however, is the following. Often, we may take displeasure in 
someones deformities but also feel such displeasure as inappropriate. This is because 
sometimes we not only experience peoples deformities with displeasure, but also 
experience second-order responses indicating that our displeasure is undeserved. 
Does this undermine DRU**? I do not think so, for the following reasons. The 
experience just mentioned is rather tangled. Importantly, it seems to me to involve a 
confusion between two different senses of inappropriate, i.e., aesthetic and ethical 
inappropriateness, which are, moreover, directed at different objects. Let me explain. 
Consider the unfortunate sitter in Quinten Massys portrait An Old Woman, better known 
as The Ugly Duchess. This woman looks ugly; anyhow, she is paradigmatically so 
considered. So it seems correct to say that she is ugly at least insofar as her appearance 
goes. Yet, she no more deserves to be ugly (or to have suffered Pagets bone disease) 
than the next person. Now, ethically, it may be advisable to try and moderate our 
expression of displeasure in interacting with a person with the Duchess looks in real life. 
Indeed, it is advisable that we do so, since people can be deeply hurt by our responses. 
Perhaps it is also the case that our effort to overcome our displeasure in experiencing 
another person with severe deformities is all the greater if we consider their looks to be 
undeserved. Yet it no more follows from this that aesthetically they do not deserve to be 
judged ugly, or that our displeasure in their deformity is unmerited, than it follows from the 
fact that Sophia Lorens or James Deans looks, and Maria Callas voice, are largely down 
to natural lottery, that we should be mistaken in judging them beautiful and delighting in 
our experience of them. Returning to ugliness, the groom in the Marine Wedding series of 
photographs is a case in point. Having suffered gross injuries as marine sergeant in the 
Iraq war, he had to undergo multiple stages of facial reconstruction, such as he has no 
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recognizable facial characteristics, except his eyes and mouth. Unpalatable though it 
sounds, he seems physically ugly.
Hence, our discomfort in uttering our judgement or guilt-ridden displeasure should 
not be taken to discredit my proposal, namely that, insofar as someone or something is 
deformed in the sense outlined here, and the experience of such deformity displeases us, 
then she or he or it is ugly, although we may decide (with good reason) that expressing 
this would be (ethically) inappropriate.
A fourth and last counterexample to DRU** is the following. Dragons, cyclopses, 
werewolves, vampires and mummies, are deformed, hybrid creatures. Often, moreover, 
such creatures repel, horrify, and otherwise displease us. Yet, we do not necessarily call 
these monsters ugly and sometimes it would be strange to do so.
This objection rests on a mistake. For dragons, vampires, and the like, 
notwithstanding the fact that they are ®ctional, are species or kinds of their own, with their 
own form, ends or functions. We may sometimes call them deformed or conceive of them 
as deformed in virtue of their anthropomorphic qualities which render them prone to being 
seen as humans. But the fact that some monsters may sometimes be thought to be 
deformed and displease us, but not found ugly, does not undermine DRU**. This is 
because the aforementioned creatures are not deformed. (although presumably some 
specimens of them are). Nor, I think, do we normally experience them as deformed, 
provided we are acquainted with their ®ctional existence. But DRU** requires that an 
object is deformed. Hence, monsters that are not found ugly are no counterexample to 
DRU**.
Thus, in addition to its merits, DRU** survives re¯ective scrutiny. Pending any 
serious worries, we should accept the present proposal.
24
IV.
I have argued that, with some quali®cations, deformity and displeasure jointly suf®ce for 
ugliness. First, I offered several considerations in favour of the connection between 
ugliness and deformity, and rejected a number of alternative suggestions. Second, I 
suggested that DRU** is theoretically meritorious, offering a partly objective conception of 
ugliness, which is comprehensive, informative, and explanatorily forceful. Third, I 
responded to a number of counterexamples designed to suggest that some objects can 
meet the conditions in DRU** yet not be ugly. I conclude that the deformity-related 
conception of ugliness, articulated in DRU**, is well-founded.
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